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THE SEC PREEMPTS THE ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES BOARD IN 1965: THE 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE DEFERRED 
TAX CREDIT RELATING TO 
INSTALLMENT SALES
Abstract: In 1959, the Accounting Principles Board (APB) replaced the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure because the latter was unable 
to deal forthrightly with a series of important issues. But during the 
APB’s first half-dozen years, its record of achievement was no more 
impressive than its predecessor’s. The chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Manuel F. Cohen, criticized the APB’s 
slow pace and unwillingness to tackle difficult issues. This article 
discusses the circumstances attending the SEC’s issuance of an Ac-
counting Series Release in late 1965 to demonstrate forcefully to the 
APB that, when it is unable to carry out its responsibility to “narrow 
the areas of difference” in accounting practice, the SEC is prepared 
to step in and do so itself. In this sense, the article deals with the ten-
sions between the private and public sectors in the establishment of 
accounting principles in the U.S. during the mid-1960s. The article 
makes extensive use of primary resource materials in the author’s 
personal archive, which have not been used previously in published 
work.
INTRODUCTION
 In 1959, the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants (Institute, AICPA) appointed a new body, the Accounting 
Principles Board (APB), to succeed the Committee on Account-
ing Procedure (CAP). The APB had been charged to do a better 
job than its predecessor in raising the standard of accounting 
practice [see Zeff, 2001]. But the APB got off to a slow and un-
certain start. In an embarrassing decision made in early 1962, 
it rejected the recommendations of a research study it had 
commissioned on broad accounting principles and shelved the 
Acknowledgments: The author is grateful to Hugo Nurnberg, Sundaresh 
Ramnath, and an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft, as well 
as to Bill Coxsey and Travis Holt for services provided.
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study [see Moonitz, 1974, pp. 17-20]. In early 1963, the APB was 
rebuffed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
on the investment tax credit [see Moonitz, 1966]. Finally, in 
1964-1966, the APB seemed poised to right its course. Foremost 
among the reasons for this turn of events were (1) the decision 
by the Institute’s executive committee to abandon its policy of 
appointing only the strong-willed managing partners of the Big 
Eight accounting firms to the board, and (2) the decision by the 
new board chairman, Clifford V. Heimbucher, a past president of 
the Institute and a partner in a small San Francisco CPA firm, to 
organize the board’s work more effectively [Carey, 1970, pp. 130-
132]. These were administrative improvements of considerable 
importance.
 But there was a third reason – the increasing public pres-
sure from the activist chairman of the SEC, Manuel F. Cohen. 
In a series of speeches, he urged the APB to make the difficult 
decisions so as to “narrow the areas of difference and inconsis-
tency in practice,” which the CAP had set as one of its objectives 
in 1953, and which had been laid down as an objective for the 
APB by the Institute’s Special Committee on Research Program 
in 1958 [“Report to Council of the Special Committee . . . ,” 1958, 
pp. 62-63]. 
 In 1965, the APB was drafting an Opinion on the status of 
the CAP’s Accounting Research Bulletins. In its exposure draft, 
it proposed to classify the deferred tax credit as a current li-
ability when it relates to installment sales receivables shown 
as a current asset. Then the board recanted its position, greatly 
annoying one of its supporters, Arthur Andersen & Co. (AA). In 
late 1965, AA petitioned the SEC to require its classification as a 
current liability, thus overruling the APB. Manuel Cohen seized 
upon the petition as an opportunity to lecture a delegation from 
the APB at a specially called meeting of the Commission and 
then to issue an Accounting Series Release on the deferred tax 
classification as requested by AA. It was unprecedented for the 
SEC to issue a rule on accounting recognition, measurement, 
or classification in an area in which the accounting profession 
had declined to act after having initially undertaken to do so.1 
This action by the SEC has been little noticed in the literature 
1To be sure, the SEC’s accounting staff had exerted its influence on the CAP 
and the APB in other ways. The only comparable confrontation between the 
standard setter and the SEC on income tax allocation occurred in 1945, when 
the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 53 [SEC, 1945] in order to limit the 
applicability of ARB No. 23 [CAP, 1944]. 
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[cf. see Pines, 1965, pp. 739-740; Defliese, 1974, p. 39], and 
there is some evidence to suggest that the SEC’s release was a 
factor contributing to the APB’s greater inclination to address 
difficult questions head-on in 1966-1967, especially on pensions 
and income tax allocation. In its later years, however, the APB 
foundered once again, in particular on accounting for business 
combinations [see Chatov, 1975, chap. 14; Seligman, 2003, pp. 
418-430]. In 1973, the APB was succeeded by the independent 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. It is the purpose of this 
paper to examine in some depth this unique intervention by the 
SEC in the process by which the profession established account-
ing principles in the mid-1960s.
BACKGROUND
 When the APB was established in 1959, the Institute’s ex-
ecutive committee, probably at the behest of President Louis H. 
Penney, decided that only managing partners would be invited 
to represent the Big Eight firms on the board.2 The executive 
committee apparently believed that the board would be mak-
ing broad policy decisions based on technical support from its 
research staff, and that the managing partners were the most 
suited to making such executive decisions. But it quickly be-
came evident that the board could not avoid immersing itself 
in highly technical issues. It also became clear that a number 
of the managing partners were not technical specialists, did 
not always read their agenda materials prior to the meetings, 
were typically men of strong conviction, and, thus, did not work 
easily together during the board’s early years. Also, the board 
exhausted itself in lengthy debates leading up to Opinion Nos. 2 
and 4 [APB, 1962, 1964] on the investment tax credit, on which 
a total of 11 members dissented and a further nine filed quali-
fied assents. Further, the board expended considerable time and 
energy on the controversial research study on accounting princi-
ples [Sprouse and Moonitz, 1962] and on a recommendation to 
Council on the authority that the board should be given to make 
changes in “generally accepted accounting principles” (GAAP) 
[Zeff, 1972, pp. 180-182].
 By 1964, it became clear to the Institute’s executive com-
mittee that its policy on managing partners had been a mistake, 
2The lone exception was Weldon Powell, the senior technical partner of 
Haskins & Sells. Powell had chaired the special committee that called for estab-
lishment of the APB and the new accounting research division to provide the 
board with technical support.
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and it proceeded to appoint the Big Eight firms’ senior technical 
partners as the terms of their firms’ managing partners expired 
[see Zeff, 1972, p. 193]. (It was always the Institute’s unstated 
policy to have one representative on the board from each Big 
Eight firm.) By 1966, all but one of the managing partners of 
the Big Eight firms had departed the board. The lone exception 
was John W. Queenan, who had succeeded Weldon Powell as 
the representative of Haskins & Sells in 1963. But Queenan had 
served on the CAP from 1949 to 1954 and was strongly inter-
ested in technical accounting issues.
 When Heimbucher became chairman of the board in 1964, 
he established subject-area subcommittees to study and draft 
Opinions. Previously, the board itself had done the drafting in 
plenum. Also, he arranged for an administrative staff to circular-
ize exposure drafts and to read and analyze the letters of com-
ment, thus freeing up time for the accounting research staff to 
concentrate on research. In addition, he set up a planning com-
mittee to set priorities and target dates for the board’s agenda of 
projects. Finally, he allowed board members to bring an adviser 
to board meetings [see Heimbucher, 1966].
 All the while, the board was being criticized in the financial 
press, in speeches by Leonard Spacek, the outspoken and feisty 
managing partner of AA, and by SEC Chairman Cohen. The is-
sue coming in for the greatest attention was over “uniformity” v. 
“flexibility” when companies made choices of accounting prin-
ciples, including the consequent diversity of accounting prac-
tice. Spacek spoke in favor of greater uniformity, while several 
other large firms, such as Price Waterhouse & Co. and Haskins 
& Sells, defended flexibility in the choice of accounting princi-
ples.3 The SEC was on record for many years as favoring greater 
uniformity, and, in a speech in late 1964, Cohen [1964, p. 12] 
became more insistent that decisive progress be made in that di-
rection. He said that “an immediate and pressing objective is to 
eliminate the use of alternative accounting principles underlying 
financial statements not justified by differing circumstances.” 
During its first 5½ years, by the end of 1964, the APB had issued 
only five Opinions, and none had had the effect of narrowing ac-
cepted practice.4
3See the symposium, “Uniformity in Financial Accounting” [1965], for pa-
pers by Spacek, Weldon Powell, J. Arnold Pines (of the SEC staff), and others. 
For the Price Waterhouse view, see Bevis [1965] and Grady [1965, pp. 32-34].
4It was not for lack of trying, however. In Opinion No. 2 [APB, 1962], a 
divided board tried mightily to limit to one the number of ways to account for 
the investment tax credit. But the SEC was lobbied into allowing an alternative 
4
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WHY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DEFERRED TAX 
CREDIT BECAME IMPORTANT TO SPACEK  
AND ANDERSEN IN 1965 
 It was in this roiling environment that Leonard Spacek and 
AA became concerned about the diversity of practice allowed for 
treating the deferred tax credit arising from retailers’ use of the 
installment method for recognizing gross income for income tax 
purposes coincident with recording sales revenue for financial 
reporting purposes as soon as an installment sale was made. Re-
tailers, especially the department stores and mail-order houses, 
were the industry most significantly marked by this diversity of 
practice. The majority of companies had been classifying the 
deferred tax credit as a noncurrent liability. A few were display-
ing it as a current liability. Some companies had deducted the 
deferred tax credit from the installment receivables [see Hicks, 
1966, p. 130].
 Norman O. Olson [1966, p. 60], a partner in AA’s executive 
office, explained why the deferred tax credit was becoming of 
increasing importance to companies in the retail industry. Refer-
ring to the divergence in practice between its classification as 
current or noncurrent, he wrote:
 The effect of this divergence in practice was assum-
ing greatly increased significance by 1965, and it was 
likely to increase even further. With the expanded use 
of revolving credit plans and various other installment 
payment plans by merchandising companies and with 
the relatively recent regulations of the Internal Revenue 
Service permitting sales under revolving credit plans to 
be treated as installment sales for income tax purposes, 
many companies were accumulating an increasingly 
large amount of deferred income taxes on installment 
sales.
Olson added that the classification of deferred tax “has a signifi-
cant effect on the determination of a company’s working capital 
and the credit rating it receives.”
 The classification of the deferred tax credit became an im-
portant issue to Spacek and AA in early 1965, when the presi-
dent of one of its major retail clients, Montgomery Ward & Co., 
Incorporated (MW) complained about having to show its credit 
method, and, in Opinion No. 4 [APB, 1964], the board reluctantly conceded de-
feat. This rebuff of the board by the SEC provoked considerable comment in the 
press.
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as a current liability in its 1964-1965 financial statements (fis-
cal year ending on February 3, 1965). In line with a position 
which it had recently announced, AA [1962, pp. 66-67] insisted 
that MW classify its deferred tax credit as a current liability. The 
current portion of the deferred tax credit balance in its balance 
sheet dated February 3, 1965 was $3.9m, which represented 
1.8% of its total current liabilities excluding the credit, but the 
president surely knew in early 1965 that this percentage would 
increase steeply in the years ahead. (It did indeed rise to 6.5% 
by February 2, 1966 and to 9.7% a year later.) Sears, Roebuck 
and Co., a much larger retail company, also based in Chicago, 
and audited by Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart, had been display-
ing its deferred tax credit as noncurrent. The balance of Sears’ 
deferred tax credit on January 31, 1965, the end of its fiscal year, 
was $454m, equal to one-third of its total current liabilities on 
that date.5 MW’s president wanted to know why his company 
should be penalized for carrying the credit as a current liability 
while most other major retailers were not. Spacek agreed that 
his company should not be penalized, and he offered him a deal. 
If MW would agree to show the credit as a current liability in its 
1964-1965 financial statements, and if Spacek could not get the 
APB to call for a uniform classification of the credit as a current 
liability by the end of 1965, he would approve of MW’s adoption 
of noncurrent treatment in its 1965-1966 financial statements. 
MW’s president agreed to the deal.6
SPACEK’S EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE APB  
TO ACT ON DEFERRED TAXES
 Previously, the CAP had dealt with the tax effect of a tim-
ing difference between reporting accelerated depreciation for 
income tax purposes and recording straight-line depreciation 
expense for financial reporting purposes (Accounting Research 
5Neither MW nor Sears disclosed the current portion of its deferred tax 
credit, that is, the portion relating to installment receivables shown as current 
assets, in their 1965 year-end annual reports. Yet both companies had to break 
down their deferred tax credit account into its current and noncurrent compo-
nents in their February 2, 1966/January 31, 1966 balance sheets, owing to the 
dictum in Accounting Series Release No. 102 [SEC, 1965] (see below). They were 
also obliged to give, which they did, the comparative current/noncurrent break-
down for the previous year’s balance sheet. As will be seen, the SEC release dealt 
with the classification of the deferred tax credit only in relation to installment 
receivables shown as current assets. 
6This anecdote is recounted in interviews with George R. Catlett, September 
3, 1970 and May 3, 1978.
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Bulletin [ARB] No. 44 Revised) [CAP, 1958]. It had recommended 
that, except in special circumstances, such differences should 
be accounted for as deferred taxes. The CAP announced in 1959 
that the deferred tax credit account relating to the depreciation 
differential should be shown in the balance sheet as a liability 
or deferred credit, not as part of equity capital [CAP, 1959]. As 
far back as 1944, the CAP had recommended that a provision 
should be made for the estimated tax to be paid on installment 
sales which were deferred for income tax purposes (ARB No. 23, 
final paragraph) [CAP, 1944]. The CAP reaffirmed this position 
in paragraph 18 of Chapter 10B of ARB No. 43 [CAP, 1953]. But 
the CAP did not say how to classify the deferred tax credit ac-
count. In the retail field, as indicated, there was a lack of agree-
ment whether the deferred tax credit should be shown as a cur-
rent or noncurrent liability when the installment sales receivable 
was shown as a current asset.
 During 1964-1965, the APB was deliberating a pronounce-
ment, which became Opinion No. 6 issued in October 1965, in 
which it was to announce which of the CAP’s Accounting Re-
search Bulletins should be continued without amendment and 
which should either be revised or be withdrawn entirely.7 All of 
the board members, as well as Andrew Barr, the SEC chief ac-
countant, were invited by Chairman Heimbucher to give their 
views on which of the ARBs should be retained, in their original 
form or as amended. In a letter dated May 26, 1965, Leonard 
Spacek, who was in his last year of service on the board, replied 
that the definition of current liabilities in ARB No. 43, Chapter 
3A, paragraph 7 [CAP, 1953] should be amended to include de-
ferred taxes to the extent that they relate to current assets, such 
as the current portion of installment sales receivable. It was 
expected that much of the impact of this amendment would be 
on retailers.8 On June 4, 1965, Andrew Barr replied at length to 
7The board’s review of the ARBs became necessary after the AICPA Council 
decided in October 1964 that any departures in company financial statements 
from accounting principles accepted in the board’s Opinions and in the ARBs 
had to be disclosed either in the footnotes or in the auditor’s report, effective 
with financial statements for fiscal periods beginning after December 31, 1965. 
The board, therefore, had to determine which of the contents of the ARBs, with 
or without amendment, were to serve as this benchmark.
8The references to board correspondence and board minutes are drawn from 
files that AA generously allowed the author to copy during the summers of 1982 
and 1983 in the firm’s Chicago executive office, at the invitation of Arthur R. 
Wyatt. Documents have been obtained from other sources as well. Researchers 
interested in pursuing the issue raised in this article are invited to inspect copies 
of the related documents in the author’s personal archive.
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Heimbucher’s invitation, and, among other things, stated that 
“Paragraph 7 [of ARB No. 43, Chapter 3A] should be expanded 
to specifically state that liabilities maturing in the time period 
of the operating cycle should be included in current liabilities, 
such as liabilities related to installment receivables and deferred 
income taxes on installment sales.”
 Spacek sought the view of Anson Herrick, a retired San 
Francisco practitioner who, as a member of the CAP in the 
1940s, had drafted ARB No. 30, “Current Assets and Current 
Liabilities – Working Capital” [CAP, 1947], which served as the 
basis for Chapter 3A of ARB No. 43. Herrick replied that he sup-
ported the proposed classification of the deferred tax credit as a 
current liability in such circumstances. He said that “[the classi-
fication] is completely consistent with the cycle theory which I 
originated.”9
 In 1953, no less an authority than Carman G. Blough, the 
Institute’s director of research, who attended the meetings of the 
CAP, had opined that the deferred tax credit relating to install-
ment receivables should be shown as a current liability in line 
with ARB No. 30 [Blough, 1953, p. 347].
 SEC Chairman Cohen [1966, p. 59] was later to say that, 
in 1965, “no fewer than four different reporting methods were 
used by companies for which the [deferred tax] item was of 
considerable importance. . . . Significantly, each method carried 
the opinion of an independent public accountant reporting that 
the financial statements had been prepared in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles.” Clearly, a uniform ap-
proach was lacking.10
 At its meeting on June 21-23, 1965, the APB unanimously 
approved Spacek’s proposed amendment of paragraph 7, and it 
was duly included in the board’s exposure draft that was issued 
in July [“Exposure Draft of Tentative Opinion . . . ,” 1965].11 The 
draft was widely circulated, including a special mailing to the 
presidents of the some 1,300 companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange. The pertinent passage in the exposure draft 
appeared in paragraph 13. In that paragraph, it was stated that 
the AICPA’s accounting research division will conduct a research 
study on current assets and liabilities, and that, “[p]ending 
completion of this study, and publication of a Board Opinion 
 9letter from Herrick to Spacek, dated June 17, 1965
10This matter was also discussed at length by Rappaport [1972, pp. 3-7 to 
3-10].
11AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, June 21-23, 1965, p. 1
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thereon,” the following paragraph was to be added to Chapter 
3A (p. 58):
10. Whenever it is appropriate to record deferred in-
come taxes, such deferred taxes should be classified as 
a current liability in the balance sheet to the extent that 
they are related to current assets which give rise to the 
tax deferment.
As can be seen, the proposed change was solely one of balance-
sheet classification, and it was to be reconsidered once the board 
could review the research study on current assets and liabilities. 
The provision did not pretend to impose tax allocation account-
ing (today known as deferred tax accounting) where it had other-
wise not been recommended by the CAP or the APB. Indeed, 
the APB was then considering whether to pronounce in favor or 
against tax allocation generally, and two of the Big Eight firms 
(Price Waterhouse & Co. and Haskins & Sells) had already regis-
tered antipathy, or at least profound skepticism, toward any tax 
allocation at all. AA was the Big Eight firm that was the strong-
est advocate of tax allocation.
 During the board’s June meeting, George R. Catlett suc-
ceeded Spacek as AA’s representative on the board. He later 
recalled that board member Ira Schur of S.D. Leidesdorf & Co., 
a middle-sized firm based in New York City, said that his firm 
had been trying to persuade City Stores, one of its clients, to 
reclassify its deferred tax liability relating to installment receiv-
ables as current but had been unable to do so because of the 
noncurrent classification used by most other companies in the 
industry. He also recalled that board member Donald J. Bevis of 
Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart said that he had always favored 
the current classification for the deferred tax credit relating to 
installment sales.12 Touche, Ross, the auditor of Sears, was then 
the predominant Big Eight firm with major clients in retail trade 
– department stores, mail-order houses, etc. [see Zeff and Fos-
sum, 1967, p. 317].
 Key commentators on the exposure draft expressed reserva-
tions or outright opposition to paragraph 13 on the current clas-
sification. The Panel on Accounting Principles of the Financial 
Executives Institute argued that the paragraph prejudged the 
research study on current assets and liabilities still under way 
 
12internal AA memorandum from George R. Catlett to partners R.I. Jones, 
W.J. Mueller, J.J. Brice, and J.W. Boyle, dated July 1, 1965
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by the board’s research staff.13 Awaiting the results of research 
has always been an easy argument to make against unwelcome 
changes in accounting principles. The Retail Committee on 
Accounting Principles of the National Retail Merchants As-
sociation (NRMA), representing 15 major department stores 
and mail-order houses (including MW, Sears, and City Stores), 
objected to the reclassification. It argued that only income taxes 
payable during the current year should be shown as current: 
“The deferred income taxes of retailers arising out of the install-
ment method of tax accounting are, in effect, a long-term obliga-
tion which is not payable until the outstanding receivables are 
liquidated – a very remote possibility in a going business.”14
 Of the 15 companies represented on the NRMA’s accounting 
principles committee (apart from MW and Sears), five had bal-
ances in their deferred tax credit account relating to installment 
receivables that were equal to or exceeded 15% of their total 
current liabilities, excluding the credit, at the end of their 1964-
1965 fiscal years: J.C. Penney Company, Inc. (16.8%), Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc. (18.8%), May Department Stores Company 
(20.3%), Miller & Rhoads, Inc. (48.9%), and Rich’s Inc. (50.6%) . 
Five of the other companies disclosed that they had balances of 
less than 15%, while no information is available for the remain-
ing three companies.15
 One reason why retail companies objected to the current 
classification of the deferred tax credit was that it did not rep-
resent a current claim on liquid assets and, thus, would give a 
misleading impression of a retailer’s ability to meet its financial 
obligations. It would also place such companies in an awkward 
position because of the working capital requirements stipulated 
in their bond indentures.16
 In correspondence among board members following issu-
ance of the exposure draft, the two Big Eight firms that were 
known to be unsympathetic toward tax allocation, mentioned 
13letter from J.R. Janssen, chairman of the Panel, to Richard C. Lytle (APB 
administrative director), dated September 15, 1965
14letter from K.S. Axelson, chairman of the committee, to Richard C. Lytle, 
dated September 15, 1965
15These percentages were developed from ProQuest’s Historical Annual 
Reports service and from Moody’s Industrials for the year 1966. Because of the 
unavailability of the other three companies’ annual reports and their omission 
from Moody’s Industrials, it was impossible to determine how much of the bal-
ances in their deferred tax credit account, if any, was attributable to installment 
receivables. 
16letter from Malise L. Graham, of the New York law firm of Faulkner, 
Dawkins & Sullivan, to William D. Hall, a partner of AA, dated March 30, 1966
10
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above, made known their disagreement with paragraph 13. In 
retrospect, it is surprising that they assented to the provision 
during the June meeting of the board. Board member Herman 
W. Bevis, the senior partner of Price Waterhouse, recommend-
ed that the paragraph be deleted, as it was not clear, he said, 
whether the deferred tax credit was a liability at all, even though 
it must be shown on the liability side of the balance sheet. He 
believed that it was, in essence, only a contingency.17 Bevis said 
he had canvassed his partners for their views, and it seems likely 
that his partners had in turn canvassed the views of their retail 
clients. Haskins & Sells submitted a memorandum in which it 
also opposed the provision, as it believed that the amount might 
never fall due. The firm said that the balance in the deferred tax 
credit account might constantly grow and, thus, may never ma-
ture as an amount to be paid. The firm conceded that it would 
be more theoretically defensible to classify the deferred tax 
as a current liability if it were expected to mature within one 
year from the balance sheet date. The firm also argued that the 
board’s proposed reclassification goes beyond prevailing prac-
tice. Furthermore, it said, any such recommendation should 
await completion of the research studies on current assets and 
liabilities and on tax allocation accounting.18 Letters submitted 
by the board members from Ernst & Ernst (E&E) and Lybrand, 
Ross Bros. & Montgomery (LRB&M), which were two of the 
other Big Eight firms, did not mention the proposed reclassifica-
tion in paragraph 13.19
 At the board’s next meeting, on September 16-17, 1965, it re-
versed its unanimous approval of paragraph 13. The board voted 
14-2 to delete the provision on the classification of deferred tax 
“on the condition that a subcommittee would be appointed to 
consider the subject.”20 It was the only item in the exposure draft 
that the board deleted in its entirety [Lytle, 1965, p. 72]. George 
Catlett “objected strenuously to deferring this question” [Olson, 
1966, p. 61]. Richard C. Lytle [1965, p. 72], the board’s admin-
istrative director, gave the following reasons for the board’s ac-
tion:
17letter from Herman W. Bevis to Reed K. Storey (AICPA director of account-
ing research), dated August 9, 1965
18memorandum attached to the letter from Oscar S. Gellein to Richard C. 
Lytle, dated September 10, 1965
19letters from Hassel Tippit (E&E) to Richard C. Lytle, dated July 20, 1965, 
and from Philip L. Defliese (LRB&M) to members of the APB, dated September 
13, 1965
20AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, September 16-17, 1965, p. 4.
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 Unlike other changes proposed in the exposure 
draft, this paragraph was directed to a matter not spe-
cifically covered in the ARBs and its inclusion would 
have been consistent with what appears to be the more 
predominant accepted practice currently.
He added that it could have “important implications with regard 
to the broad area of accounting for income taxes,” a subject on 
which a research study was being completed (which had been 
in preparation since 1961). One major question, he said, was 
“whether deferred income taxes are a ‘deferred credit’ or a ‘li-
ability’.” This last point, which had been debated for years, was 
probably significant in crippling the effort to classify the de-
ferred tax, if only in defined circumstances, as a current liability.
In its Executive Letter to partners and managers, Price Water-
house said: “The APB decided to omit the [reclassification] 
requirement from Opinion No. 6 largely because it was out of 
context with an opinion having the avowed purpose of revising 
existing pronouncements in order to ‘obviate conflicts between 
present accepted practice and provisions of outstanding Bulle-
tins’” [“Special Bulletin . . . ,” 1965, p. 4].
 AA’s Catlett was convinced that the reversal was a clear re-
sult of client pressure brought on the firms, whose board repre-
sentatives had not realized in June how large the impact of the 
reclassification might be on their clients’ balance sheets.21 Not 
surprisingly, the paragraph had met with considerable opposi-
tion from retail industry commentators on the exposure draft, 
including a number of major companies, such as Broadway-
Hale Stores, Sears, Spiegel, and MW, which wrote separate let-
ters apart from the letter from the NRMA.22 Many of those op-
posing the paragraph on classifying deferred tax criticized the 
precedent of linking an item on the liability side of the balance 
sheet with one or more classes of assets; instead, they believed 
that the deferred tax should be classified according to when it 
will be liquidated. Others questioned whether the deferred tax 
would ever actually be paid, and, thus, they saw no ground for 
requiring that it reduce working capital. Some said that the 
reclassification went beyond the scope of the pronouncement, 
which was to determine which pre-existing positions in the 
ARBs were to be regarded as still in force. Opinion No. 6, “Status 
of Accounting Research Bulletins,” was published in October 
21interview with George R. Catlett, May 3, 1978
22These separate letters were in the batches of comment letters conveyed to 
the board by Richard Lytle.
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1965 and reproduced in the November issue of the Journal of 
Accountancy.
AA PETITIONS THE SEC
 On October 1, 1965, two weeks after the board meeting 
at which paragraph 13 was deleted, AA petitioned the SEC to 
 issue an Accounting Series Release (ASR) that would classify 
the deferred tax arising from current assets such as installment 
sales receivable as a current liability. AA knew, of course, that 
SEC Chief Accountant Andrew Barr had advised the APB that 
he favored such a classification. And, as mentioned above, SEC 
Chairman Cohen had been railing against the diversity in ac-
counting practice. The firm had reason to believe that the SEC 
might be sympathetic to its cause. Yet it privately harbored 
doubts that the SEC would act favorably on its petition.23
 As was the SEC’s practice in such matters, AA’s petition was 
held in confidence, except that Barr notified Richard Lytle, at the 
board, that AA had filed the petition. Barr inquired if the board 
might be able to act on the deferred classification by November 
15, which was viewed as the deadline for the SEC to publish a 
proposed accounting rule that, after a 30-day exposure period, 
could be adopted in time to apply to financial statements ending 
on or before December 31. At Lytle’s request, and with the acqui-
escence of Barr, AA provided the APB with a copy of the petition 
for confidential circulation to the board members. The board’s 
planning subcommittee met on October 22. It concluded that 
the subject was too complex for the board to be able to act on 
the matter by the end of 1965.
 Contrary to what some might have expected, namely, that 
AA would publicize its petition to vaunt the role it was playing to 
achieve greater uniformity in financial reporting, the firm rarely 
mentioned its authorship of the petition in its publications, and 
only well after the event.24 Chief Accountant Barr had advised AA 
that the Commission would prefer that the firm not publicize the 
petition until it was acted upon, and the firm complied.25
23interview with George R. Catlett, September 3, 1970
24The only two mentions the author has found are in Olson [1966, p. 61] 
and AA [1969, p. 67]. Spacek did not mention the petition in his speeches. The 
author can find no other mentions in the literature of AA being the source of the 
petition. Cohen [1966, p. 59] said that “a leading accounting firm” had petitioned 
the SEC but did not name the firm.
25 interviews with George R. Catlett, September 3, 1970 and May 3, 1978
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THE SEC CONFERS WITH A DELEGATION  
FROM THE APB
 In November 1965, the SEC invited the APB to send a del-
egation to meet with the five members of the Commission to 
discuss the AA petition. The four members of the APB’s plan-
ning committee, composed of Chairman Clifford Heimbucher, 
Herman Bevis (Price Waterhouse and APB vice chairman), 
John Queenan (Haskins & Sells), and Frank T. Weston (Arthur 
Young & Company), accompanied by two senior staff members, 
attended the conference. All four of the APB members in attend-
ance were practitioners who were held in high regard for their 
serious dedication to the development of accounting principles. 
The hour-long meeting was held in the SEC’s offices in Washing-
ton on November 22. SEC Chairman Cohen presided, and Chief 
Accountant Barr attended.26 It was one of the rare occasions on 
which the Commission met formally with members of the APB, 
and it was rarer still for such a meeting to be recorded on a 
stenographic transcript.27 In his prepared remarks, Cohen made 
it known that the Commission’s staff had “as early as August, 
1950 recommended to a committee of the American Institute 
of Accountants to take a firm position” (p. 3) in the matter of 
the classification of deferred tax in such cases. He added: “The 
increasing incidence of these practices and the growing signifi-
cance of the amounts involved convince us that the petition is 
right in urging us to act now rather than to tolerate further delay 
which your procedures would seem to require” (p. 3).
 Cohen quoted from the AA petition as follows:
 Some companies which have heretofore included 
the deferred taxes in current liabilities have changed 
the classification to noncurrent liabilities. Other com-
panies (some of which are our clients) are now taking 
the position that they will change the classification to 
noncurrent at the end of the current fiscal year if other 
companies are permitted to continue the noncurrent 
classification. This represents a retrogression in ac-
26“In the Matter of Conference with Representatives of the Accounting 
Principles Board re: Arthur Andersen & Co. Petition,” Official Transcript of Pro-
ceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., 
November 22, 1965 (ACE-Federal Reporters, Inc, Official Reporters). Quotations 
from this transcript will be indicated by page number.
27On December 21, 1962, following issuance of the board’s controversial 
Opinion No. 2 [APB, 1962] on the investment tax credit, a delegation from the 
board met in Washington with four SEC Commissioners and several SEC staff 
members, but, as far as is known, no transcript was prepared.
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counting which occurs when such alternative practices 
exist.
Cohen stated that the SEC’s staff had already drafted a proposed 
release that would effectuate the AA petition, but that, before 
issuing the release, the Commission wanted to have the benefit 
of hearing the comments of the APB’s delegation. And then he 
bluntly expressed his unhappiness with the board’s performance 
and issued a thinly veiled threat (pp. 4-5):
. . . before we hear your comments I do want to take this 
opportunity to observe that this Commission, as you 
know, has been quite patient with the efforts of the ac-
counting profession to solve a number of accounting 
matters as to which questionable alternative solutions 
have been accepted for some time. I am sure you are 
aware that, we and important persons in other parts 
of Washington, hear and receive many complaints that 
the profession seems unable to come to grips with the 
problems and to adopt solutions, even though extensive 
studies have been made and published.
 As you know, we have certain statutory responsi-
bilities. It has been suggested strongly that if you can-
not or will not move with reasonable dispatch to cope 
with these issues, we should. Now, while our patience 
has not been exhausted and we believe that coopera-
tion with the Board has been most helpful and should 
continue, I wish to make the point that we do have a 
responsibility and that we do have to account for it.
 In reply, Heimbucher stated that the board’s decision to 
drop the paragraph on deferred tax from Opinion No. 6 [APB, 
1965] was that it had become controversial and that the pro-
nouncement had to be issued with dispatch. He added that 
“some of those who voted to remove it from the bulletin at that 
time did so on the condition that a committee of the Board be 
appointed immediately to deal forthwith with this question” (p. 
8). He said that he expected a three-man committee to report 
in time for the board’s next meeting, in December, “and it is 
our earnest belief that we will be able to reach a conclusion on 
this during 1966, allowing for all of our exposure requirements, 
which take two or three months, and then a final ballot on the 
draft” (p. 9). Heimbucher hoped to persuade the SEC not to 
 issue its release. Cohen then reminded the board members that 
the issue concerning the Commission is a larger one, namely, 
that “the profession finds great difficulty in arriving at solutions 
15
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to problems which, albeit difficult, nevertheless appear to be 
subject to solution” (p. 10).
 Herman Bevis pointed out that “these questions are far 
more difficult and far more complex than those you can state in 
rather simple form, and I myself believe, and I think you would 
agree, that what we are looking for is not just any solution which 
can’t stand up in trial very long. We are looking for sound solu-
tions” (p. 11). Cohen replied that he shared Bevis’ view, but “as 
I pointed out this problem was addressed with a certain amount 
of conviction by our Chief Accountant 15 years ago, and I would 
think anyone would agree that is a reasonable period within 
which to find a solution” (p. 11).
 John Queenan emphasized that the APB’s program of re-
search studies was now coming to the stage where the board 
will become more active in issuing Opinions. On the matter of 
income tax allocation, he said that he was one of those who did 
not consider it as a liability. To have approved the deferred tax as 
a current liability in some cases would, he said, have prejudged 
the outcome of the research study on tax allocation accounting 
that was still in preparation. Queenan also doubted that it was 
as urgent a matter as AA had argued, as he believed that the 
predominant practice was to show the deferred tax “outside of 
current [liabilities]” and that there are relatively few companies 
showing it as current. Hence, he implied, there would be few oc-
casions for switchovers.
 Chairman Cohen said he had no reason to question that the 
board could resolve the issue in 1966, but “I don’t know how 
your resolution will come out. . . . ” (p. 18). It was clear to every-
one that the Commission had made up its mind on the matter.
 Herman Bevis, who was no more sympathetic with the 
current liability classification than was Queenan, proceeded to 
argue a point that could be described as reductio ad absurdum. 
He cited Spiegel Co., which showed $120m of long-term debt 
and only $30m of noncurrent assets. He then proposed that, 
if the deferred tax associated with installment receivables (a 
current asset) should be shown as a current liability, “it imme-
diately raises the question of whether 90 of the 120 million of 
the long-term debt shouldn’t also go up there, because it has to 
apply to something on the current asset side”28 (p. 19). Chairman 
Cohen dismissed the argument peremptorily, as if everything 
 
28This same point was made by a number of commentators on the exposure 
draft.
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on the right side of the balance sheet should be linked to every-
thing on the left side. This strained argument by Bevis could 
not have given Cohen confidence in the board’s ability to solve 
the deferred tax problem. Then Bevis argued that most of the 
companies that show the deferred tax as a noncurrent item are 
the ones where the amount is the most significant, while those 
that show it as a current liability claim only small amounts, as 
if to suggest that the issue is not all that important. Amused at 
Bevis’ analysis, Chairman Cohen interjected, “May I partially in 
jest – I hope it will be so understood – say that I draw from what 
has been said that where the amount is not material and really 
can’t affect the current ratio very much they assign it to the cur-
rent section, but where it is material and could affect the current 
 ratio it is assigned elsewhere. Is that too unfair a suggestion?” 
(pp. 21-22). Bevis was not able to disagree with this reconstruc-
tion of his argument as an opportunity for manipulation.
 Cohen then ventured the view that the Commission’s draft 
release, being an interpretation of existing requirements, could 
be issued forthwith, without any prior exposure. He said he 
was interested in issuing the release in time to affect financial 
statements for the year ending December 31, 1965. Cohen also 
expressed exasperation with the board’s process: “there ought to 
be an end to all the studies and all the committees that review 
the work of prior committees, and someone ought to decide 
something” (p. 25). 
 In the course of the discussion, Heimbucher and Weston 
said they would classify deferred tax as a liability, while Queen-
an and Bevis had taken the other side. These matched pairs 
could not have filled Chairman Cohen with confidence that the 
board would successfully resolve the issue, even in 1966.
 At the end of the meeting, Heimbucher and Weston urged 
the Commission not to act in a way that would reflect unfavor-
ably on the standing of the board, and Cohen expressed sym-
pathy with their view. In fact, in a speech delivered eight days 
later, he was reassuring on this point. Cohen [1965, p. 11] said:
  We are now considering some limited action of our 
own [on accounting] – action which is not designed to 
undermine the efforts of the leaders of the profession 
but rather to emphasize to the entire profession the 
urgency of immediate and effective support of those 
who are seeking sound procedures to obviate unjustified 
differences in the treatment and presentation of similar 
problems.
17
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THE SEC ISSUES ACCOUNTING SERIES 
RELEASE NO. 102
 On December 7, 1965, the day before the next APB meet-
ing, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 102, “Balance 
Sheet Classification of Deferred Income Taxes Arising from In-
stallment Sales.”29 In the release, the Commission said: ”Where 
installment receivables are classified as current assets in ac-
cordance with the operating cycle practice [citing ARB No. 43, 
Chapter 3A], the related liabilities or credit items maturing or 
expiring in the time period of the operating cycle, including the 
deferred income taxes on installment sales, should be classified 
as current liabilities.” The SEC made no mention in the release 
of AA’s petition or of the fact that the matter had been under 
study by the APB. 
 Although AA had asked in its petition that the rule take ef-
fect for fiscal years beginning after December 31, 1965, the SEC 
opted for a much faster implementation. The rule would apply 
to fiscal years ending on or after December 31, 1965. Catlett had 
informed Chief Accountant Barr of his firm’s “deal” with MW, 
and he told Barr that if the SEC’s rule were not to take effect un-
til 1966 fiscal-year reports, MW and others in the small minority 
of retailers who were classifying the deferred tax liability as cur-
rent would all switch to noncurrent in their 1965 reports. Catlett 
believed that this argument may have been a factor in the SEC’s 
decision to accelerate the effective date.30
THE AFTERMATH OF ACCOUNTING SERIES 
 RELEASE NO. 102
 At the outset of the meeting of the APB on December 8-10, 
1965, Chairman Heimbucher handed out confidential copies of 
the transcript of the meeting with the SEC and said that, at the 
time of the meeting with the SEC, the members of the APB’s 
delegation were “certain” that the Commission would proceed 
to issue its draft release.31 Heimbucher then quoted from SEC 
Chairman Cohen’s remarks during the meeting that the board 
is taking much too long to solve the problems before it. Heim-
bucher was trying to impress on the members that, if the board 
29Publication of the release was reported in “SEC Acts to Make Concerns 
More Uniform in Handling of Assets-Liabilities Accounts,” Wall Street Journal, 
December 8, 1965, and in “SEC Prods Accountants,” Business Week, January 15, 
1966, p. 102.
30interview with George R. Catlett, dated May 3, 1978
31AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, December 8-10, 1965, p. 2
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did not begin to act more expeditiously, others, such as the SEC, 
would fill the void. Following the board’s three-day meeting, 
George Catlett reported to his partners that he detected more 
of a sense of urgency about achieving constructive and effective 
progress than had ever existed since the board’s inception. Not 
surprisingly, he said he noticed a degree of resentment toward 
AA on the part of some members, yet the salient point was that 
the impact on board members of the encounter with the SEC 
was palpable.32
 Two members of the APB’s research staff recalled that an 
effect of Accounting Series Release No. 102 was that the board 
became more careful to include in exposure drafts only those 
views for which there was strong support.33
 At a later point in the board’s meeting, some members 
thought it would be desirable for the board to state publicly 
that it was not in conflict with the SEC over Accounting Series 
Release No. 102. The board therefore voted to authorize the ad- 
ministrative director to publish a statement in the Journal of 
Accountancy [“SEC Issues Opinion...,” 1966] that it was “in 
substantial agreement with the position of the SEC.” Yet the 
informal vote to do so was 11-5, a bare two-thirds majority.34 
The statement appeared in the January 1966 issue. While there 
apparently were only a few board members who disagreed in 
principle with the position espoused in the SEC’s release, other 
board members had procedural concerns, including the belief 
that the board should not express a view on the classification 
question until the research study on current assets and liabili-
ties, and perhaps also that on income tax allocation, were com-
pleted. 
 In April 1966, Kenneth S. Axelson, the financial vice presi-
dent of J.C. Penney Company and chairman of NRMA’s account-
ing principles committee, attacked Accounting Series Release No. 
102 in a letter to the Journal of Accountancy. He said that the 
NRMA had petitioned the SEC to delay the effective date of the 
release by three months, but that its petition was denied [Axel-
son, 1966, p. 27].35
32memorandum by George R. Catlett to his partners in AA, dated December 
15, 1965 
33interview with Reed K. Storey and Paul Rosenfield, August 1970
34AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, December 8-10, 1965, p. 9
35Perhaps because of a belief that the retail industry should be better repre-
sented on the APB, the Institute’s executive committee appointed Axelson to the 
board in 1968. 
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 In May 1966, Leonard Spacek [1966, p. 381] said in a speech 
that “the SEC came to the rescue of professional accountants . . . 
while the accounting profession remained in an immobile state 
of indecision.” On the other hand, Herman Bevis [1966] criti-
cized the SEC’s release as supporting uniformity of method over 
genuine comparability in financial reporting.36
 By coincidence, in early December 1965, AA published a 
42-page booklet, Establishing Accounting Principles – A Crisis 
in Decision Making, in which it criticized the APB for its in-
effectiveness in narrowing the areas of difference in accounting 
practice. Copies of the booklet were distributed at the APB’s 
meeting on December 8. AA [1965, p. 28] argued in the booklet 
that the APB should take steps “to deal with current problems 
on a timely basis and carry out its responsibilities in a truly 
professional manner.” AA called for the establishment of a U.S. 
Court of Accounting Appeals in order to promote the uniformity 
of accounting practices prescribed by U.S. federal regulatory 
agencies, including the SEC [see “Accounting Court . . . ,” 1966]. 
At the board’s meeting, Chairman Heimbucher took the time to 
quote from SEC Chairman Cohen’s strong remarks during the 
hearing as well as from AA’s charge to the APB to improve its 
 effectiveness. The minutes of the board meeting reported that 
“Mr. Heimbucher stated that he quoted from these documents 
to emphasize the necessity for action on the part of the Board 
in dealing with accounting principles and to stress that, if the 
Board does not, other groups will assume the responsibility.”
37
 George Catlett, who was a member of the APB from 1965 
to 1971, said that the SEC’s release was the event that prompted 
the board to begin taking difficult decisions on matters that 
would change prevailing practice, and to begin paying more at-
tention to the SEC than to their clients.38
 For his part, SEC Chairman Cohen [1966, p. 59] sent a 
strong message to the APB in a speech in May 1966. He said 
that Accounting Series Release No. 102 was an example that 
“Stronger leadership by the Commission is one avenue being 
followed” in moving toward the goal of uniformity in accounting 
practice. He added: 
 Although Accounting Series Release No. 102 was 
used to resolve one problem of uniformity, I do not be-
36See also the searing criticism of the release by Theodore Herz [1966], one 
of Bevis’ partners.
37AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, December 8-10, 1965, p. 3
38interviews with George R. Catlett, September 3, 1970 and May 3, 1978
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lieve it will be necessary for us to use that device with 
great frequency—although the option is always open to 
us. The extent to which action on our part is required 
will depend in large measure on the vigor and determi-
nation of the Accounting Principles Board. . . .
 In December 1967, the APB issued Opinion No. 11, “Ac-
counting for Income Taxes,” which, in paragraph 57, explicitly 
adopted the SEC’s position in Accounting Series Release No. 102. 
The APB really had little option but to do so. Three board mem-
bers dissented, saying that this treatment “would contribute to 
a lack of understanding of working capital, because of the com-
mingling of contingent items with items which are expected to 
be realized or discharged during the normal operating cycle of 
the business.”39 The Opinion passed by the barest two-thirds ma-
jority, 14-6.
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